## AC

**Petersen 11**explains the conventionally understood difference between knowledge and mere true belief[[1]](#footnote-1)

To see the problem through the lens of utilitarian epistemic value, let us develop the ﬁnancial analogy a bit further. Holding true beliefs as analogous to money, the gaining of a true belief is analogous to proﬁt. Leaning on the common idea that knowledge is true belief that was not “lucky”, we can then say **knowledge is like earnings—**that is, **money gained through sound investments. Mere true belief**, on the other hand, **is like** a ﬁnancial **windfall—money gained by luck.**

However, knowledge reduces to merely true belief. “Reliable” sources of justification aren’t necessary for the goal of epistemology, or finding true beliefs. **Sartwell 91**[[2]](#footnote-2)

It is widely held that **our epistemic goal** with regard to particular propositions **is achieving** true beliefs and avoiding false ones about propositions with which we are epistemically concerned. (We have seen that Alston, for one, endorses that view.) That is, it is widely admitted that on any good account of justification, there must be reason to think that the **beliefs** justified on the account are **likely to be true.** Indeed, proponents of all the major conceptions of justification hold this position. For example, the foundationalist Paul Moser writes: [E]pistemic justification is essentially related to the so-called cognitive goal of truth, insofar as an individual belief is epistemically justified only if it is appropriately directed toward the goal of truth. More specifically, on the present conception, one is epistemically justified in believing a proposition only if one has good reason to believe it is true.(22) The reliabilist Alvin Goldman claims, similarly, that a condition on an account of justification is that beliefs justified on the account be likely to be true; he says that a plausible conception of justification will be "truth-linked."(23) And the coherentist Laurence BonJour puts it even more strongly: If epistemic justification were not conducive to truth in this way, if finding epistemically justified beliefs did not substantially increase the likelihood of finding true ones, epistemic justification would be irrelevant to our main cognitive goal and of dubious worth. It is only if we have some reason to think that epistemic justification constitutes a path to truth that we as cognitive human beings have any motive for preferring epistemically justified beliefs to epistemically unjustified ones. **Epistemic justification is therefore** in the final analysis **only an instrumental value, not** an **intrinsic** one.(24) In fact, it is often enough taken to be the distinguishing mark of the fact that we are epistemically concerned with a proposition that we are concerned with its truth or falsity. That is what, on the view of many philosophers, distinguishes epistemic from moral or prudential constraints on belief, what distinguishes inquiry from other belief-generating procedures. (If the theory I gave in the first chapter is right, ther are no non-epistemic belief-generating procedures in this sense. That fact merely underscores the present point.) I have argued that a **plausible normative epistemology will be teleological**. And I have claimed that the conception which accounts of knowledge are attempting to analyze or describe is that of the epistemic telos with regard to particular propositions. It would follow that, if a philosopher holds that the epistemic telos is merely true belief, that philosopher implicitly commits himself, his own asservations to the contrary, to the view that knowledge is merely true belief. I think that this is the case. I think, that is, that in the above passages, these philosophers have committed themselves implicitly to the view that knowledge is merely true belief, and that justification is a criterion rather than a logically necessary condition of knowledge. By a criterion, to repeat, I mean a test for whether some item has some property that is not itself a logically necessary condition of that item's having that property. Justification on the present view is, first of all, a means by which we achieve knowledge, that is, by which we arrive at true beliefs, and second, it provides a test of whether someone has knowledge, that is, whether her beliefs are true. So again, the present view does not make accounts of justification trivial, or unconnected with the assessment of claims to know. If our epistemic goal with regard to particular propositions is true belief, then justification (a) gives procedures by which true beliefs are obtained, and (b) gives standards for evaluating the products of such procedures with regard to that goal. From the point of view of (a), justification prescribes techniques by which knowledge is gained. From the point of view of (b) it gives a criterion for knowledge. But in neither case does it describe a logically necessary condition for knowledge. Another way of putting the matter is like this. If we describe justification as of merely instrumental value with regard to arriving at truth, as BonJour does explicitly, we can no longer maintain both that knowledge is the telos of inquiry and that justification is a necessary condition of knowledge. It is incoherent to build a specification of what are regarded merely as means of achieving some goal into the description of the goal itself; in such circumstances **the goal can be described independently of the means.** So if justification is demanded because it is instrumental to true belief, it cannot also be maintained that knowledge is justified true belief. I will now certainly be accused of begging the question by assuming that knowledge is the goal of inquiry. There is justice in this claim in that I have not gone very far toward establishing the point. But I would ask my accusers at this point whether they can do better in describing the conception which theories of knowledge set out to analyze or describe without begging the question in favor of some such theory. And I ask also, if knowledge is not the overarching epistemic telos with regard to particular propositions, why such tremendous emphasis has been placed on the theory of knowledge in the history of philosophy, and just what function that notion serves within that history. If knowledge is not the overarching purpose of inquiry, then why is the notion important, and why should we continue to be concerned in normative epistemology above all with what knowledge is and how it can be achieved? If we want to withold the term `knowledge' from mere true belief, but also want to hold that mere true belief is the purpose of inquiry, then I suggest that what remains is a mere verbal dispute. That is, if we treat mere true belief as the purpose of inquiry, but do not equate it with knowledge, then I do not think that knowledge is any longer central to normative epistemology. And I would insist that we are not going to understand what `knowledge' means in the tradition, in Plato and Descartes, for example, if we do not regard them as holding knowledge to be the goal of inquiry. In fact, if it is allowed that mere true belief is the telos of inquiry, but that we should still reserve the term `knowledge' for justified true belief (and perhaps something more), I will simply abandon the term `knowledge' to the epistemology of justification. But first of all, as I suggested in the third chapter, I think that `knowledge' will now merely be a technical term with a stipulated definition. And second, I do not think it will be central to epistemology, since it no longer represents our epistemic goal. And third, I think the stipulated definition will either be redundant (if justification is held to be truth conducive) or, as I will argue, incoherent (if it is not). Now it may well be held that justification is of more than instrumental value, because if we are not justified in believing p, though p is true and we in fact believe it, we may have false beliefs that lead us to p, and we may continue to generate false beliefs in the future. All of this is true, but it is irrelevant to the present point. Recall that I have characterized knowledge as our epistemic goal with regard to particular propositions. Insofar as p is concerned, this goal has been realized if p is true and we believe it. Insofar as we have also such goals as continuing to generate true beliefs, rendering our system of beliefs coherent, and so forth, it is desirable to have justified beliefs. But with regard to any particular proposition, our goal has been reached if we believe that proposition and it is true. But I do not want simply to let the matter rest on a supposed agreement among some contemporary epistemologists that our epistemic goal with regard to particular propositions is true belief. Such epistemologists are agreed that knowledge is at least justified true belief. I think that Alston is right to think that the only plausible way to construe this claim is that **knowledge is** at least **true belief** based on adequate grounds, or true belief **reached from a strong position.** So perhaps the figures in question, on reflection, would describe the epistemic telos not as true belief but as true belief based on adequate grounds, or true belief reached from a strong position. Only it must now be asked, why do we want to have adequate grounds? Why do we want to be in a strong position? This question ought to be misguided if true belief based on adequate grounds or true belief reached from a strong position is in fact the purpose of inquiry. For there is no good answer to the question of why we desire our ultimate ends. **But** the question is hardly misguided. In fact, we cannot even specify what it is to have adequate grounds except that these grounds tend to establish that the proposition in question is true; **we cannot** even **specify** what it is to be in **a strong position except as being in a strong position to get the truth.** This indicates that **the purpose of inquiry can be formulated without reference to** the notions of ground or **position.** Thus, on the views in question, believing the truth is in fact our overarching epistemic telos with regard to particular propositions, on the only plausible conception of justification. **Hence,** on these views, **knowledge is merely true belief.**

2 impacts.

a. Deon fails. Epistemology is fundamentally teleological. **Sartwell 91**[[3]](#footnote-3)

The most elaborately developed normative theories are in ethics, and thus normative epistemology often relies on a parallel to ethics. Ethical systems have been divided into two kinds: **deon**tological and teleological. Proponents of the former **think[s] of moral action as** what is done in **obedience to principles which serve in turn no end** that could be looked on as an overall moral goal. Moral action is to specified in terms of obligation and permission. If I do only what is permissible (possibly, if I do it because it is permissible), or what is demanded by duty (possibly, if do it because duty demands it), then I am not subject to ethical disapprobation even if the result of my action is disastrous. According to proponents of teleological ethics, on the other hand, an action is morally good when it conduces to some goal, for example, the greatest happiness of the greatest number, or if it is in accordance with some rule the observance of which so conduces. Similarly, there might be two sorts of normative epistemology: one which prescribes duties and permissions in generating beliefs (and other propositional attitudes) without regard to any overarching epistemic goal, and one which prescribes some goal for epistemic activity, and recognizes the legitimacy of any procedure that conduces to that goal, or, alternately, of any procedure which accords with certain rules the observance of which in turn conduces to that goal. I have asserted that **knowledge is the goal of inquiry. But this supposes that inquiry has some goal, which would be denied by** a proponent of **deon**tological normative epistemology. So we had better start with a discussion of whether that position is plausible. The taxonomy of normative epistemology suggested by this particular parallel to ethics has been developed by William Alston. Because my discussion follows his to some extent, I should pause here to diffentiate my use of terms from his. Alston uses the term `deontological' to distinguish systems which epistemically prescribe, proscribe, or permit certain beliefs or belief-generating procedures, from what he terms `evaluative' systems, which merely assess certain beliefs and procedures from the standpoint of some standard.(19) He points out that it is not the case that all standards of evaluation depend on such concepts as obligation and permission, that not all standards carry with them the implication that the subject is praiseworthy for meeting them or blameworthy for violating them. For example, to say that some person is beautiful is to evaluate her appearance positively, but it is not to say that she is praiseworthy for her appearance, since she may not be responsible for it; it may be a genetic endowment.(20) The relevant point here is that both sorts of systems (Alston's `deontological' and `evaluative') are what I term `teleological'; he describes both as being directed to the goal of generating true belief and avoiding false belief. It may be a question, then, whether any philosopher has seriously held a deontological position in my sense, has seriously held that we have some epistemic obligations but that there is no overarching goal of inquiry. Some extreme idealists and postivists, who identify truth and justification, may harbour such a view. If one has a coherence theory of truth and also a coherence theory of justification, for example, then one may simply count as knowledge whatever beliefs are generated by whatever procedures turn out to embody justification; **if it was supposed to be** a **sheer fact that we ought to follow such procedures**, if there were no further goal in mind, **this would be** a **deon**tological position in my sense. The notion of **knowledge is** in some sense **superfluous on this position;** at least, **it does not describe** a **distinctive purpose for inquiry above** the **fulfillment of certain duties** or obedience to certain rules. Clearer examples of deontological views could be proposed: for example, believe all and only the propositions contained in the Bible, or in the writings of Mao. Deontological views in my sense have, these days, few proponents, and seem on the face of it extreme and implausible. Their implausibility can be brought out in the following way. What is the source of our epistemic obligations? Or, to put it another way, is there any good reason to think that we have any distictively epistemic obligations at all, in the absence of some overarching purpose for inquiry? **The** same **problem arises for deon**tological **moral theories**, but here there are plausible, or at least fairly widely proffered, answers: our moral obligations derive from God, for example, or from the state. Again, it is possible that the very same sources yield our epistemic obligations. But to establish this, we would have to give good reasons to think that God does impose epistemic obligations, or to give an account of the "epistemic legitimacy" of the state. Furthermore, there no longer appears to be any distinction between moral and epistemic constraints on the generation of beliefs. There no longer appears to be any distinctively epistemological enterprise.

b. Util coheres with the fact that knowledge reduces to mere true belief.

**Petersen 11**[[4]](#footnote-4)

To ask “why is knowledge of more instrumental value than mere true belief?” is, on this picture, like asking “why are earned proﬁts of more instrumental value than monetary windfalls?” The answer to the ﬁnancial version of this question is clearly that the earnings are not more valuable. By analogy, then, neither is knowledge. The epistemic utilitarian embraces this conclusion and denies the intuition that knowledge is better than mere true belief, even on the instrumental version of the value question. The reason, illustrated by the analogy, is fairly simple: like anything but welfare, epistemic states are at best of instrumental value, and (as we noted earlier) generalizations about instrumental value only make sense under uncertainty. Generally charity is more valuable than murder, but **to** the classical **util**itarian (and to the classical utilitarian alone) **it is not sensible to ask “why is** a **charit[y]**able act **more valuable than** a **murder that results in the same** amount of **utility?”** To assume there is an answer here begs the question against the utilitarian. The same goes, one step down the instrumental chain, for the question “why are earnings more valuable than windfalls?” **Under uncertainty, investments with high expected** monetary **value are** in an important, instrumental sense **more valuable than those with poor expected** monetary **value, but** this question builds in the assumption that **both result in the same monetary value** (given of course that all else is equal). Finally, **the same goes for knowledge and lucky-but-true belief**; in the description of the case, both have gotten the relevant epistemic (instrumental) good. To stipulate that, despite the odds, luck-sensitive belief formation nonetheless resulted in a true belief is just like stipulating that the murder under consideration ended up net beneﬁtting people, or that the stupid casino bet ended up paying off.

Thus the standard is **maximizing happiness**. There are seven additional warrants.

First, my standard controls the link to any practical reason or contract frameworks because rational agents would consent to a universal law to maximize utility to increase the chance of their own interests being satisfied.

Second, the ultimate human good is happiness. **Darwish 09**[[5]](#footnote-5)

Let’s start with knowledge. It is clear that **those who value knowledge for its own sake** (for instance, highly motivated professionals) **find pleasure in** both the **pursuit** and attainment **of knowledge**, however exhausted they become in either case. So, granted that knowledge, for them, is **a value that has intrinsic worth** in itself, and is thus sought for itself, it **is a value that yields** their pleasure or **happiness. The same can be said about** the **other values.** Let’s take autonomy in the sense expressed by Hooker as “control over one’s own life” as another example. Here one needs to say no more than that **the mere fact that people seek autonomy explains** the satisfaction or **the pleasure autonomy brings.** Those who value autonomy, thus seek it for itself, cannot feel happy when their decisions are not in their hands, or when they do not have control over their own life. In short, they cannot be happy otherwise. Moore, who explicitly differs from the classical utilitarians in holding that pleasure is not the sole good, 20 says that “the most valuable things… are pleasures of human intercourse and the enjoyment of beautiful objects,” 21 which seems to mean that such things are valued for the pleasures and the enjoyment they bring. These examples clearly show that **though these values have intrinsic worth, they** bring or **constitute our pleasure.**

Third, conflicting moral side-constraints would paralyze state action, so states must use util to weigh deontological violations.

Fourth, respect for human worth would justify util. **Cummiskey 90**[[6]](#footnote-6)

We must not obscure the issue by characterizing this type of case as the sacrifice of individuals for some abstract “social entity.” It is not a question of some persons having to bear the cost for some elusive “overall social good.” Instead, the question is whether some persons must bear the inescapable cost for the sake of other persons. Robert Nozick, for example, argues that “to use a person in this way does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate person, that his is the only life he has.” But why is this not equally true of all those whom we do not save through our failure to act? **By emphasizing solely the one who must bear the cost if we act, we fail to** sufficiently **respect** and take account of **the many other** separate **persons**, each with only one life, **who will bear the cost of our inaction**. In such a situation, what would a conscientious Kantian agent, an agent motivated by the unconditional value of rational beings, choose? A morally good agent recognizes that the basis of all particular duties is the principle that “rational nature exists as an end in itself”. Rational nature as such is the supreme objective end of all conduct. If one truly believes that all rational beings have an equal value, then the rational solution to such a dilemma involves maximally promoting the lives and liberties of as many rational beings as possible. In order to avoid this conclusion, the non-consequentialist Kantian needs to justify agent-centered constraints. As we saw in chapter 1, however, even most Kantian deontologists recognize that agent-centered constraints require a non- value-based rationale. But we have seen that Kant’s normative theory is based on an unconditionally valuable end. How can a concern for the value of rational beings lead to a refusal to sacrifice rational beings even when this would prevent other more extensive losses of rational beings? If the moral law is based on the value of rational beings and their ends, then what is the rationale for prohibiting a moral agent from maximally promoting these two tiers of value? If I sacrifice some for the sake of others, I do not use them arbitrarily, and I do not deny the unconditional value of rational beings. **Persons** may **have “dignity**, that is, an unconditional and incomparable worth” **that transcends any market value, but persons also have** a fundamental **equality that dictates that some must** sometimes **give way for the sake of others.** The concept of the end-in-itself does not support the view that we may never force another to bear some cost in order to benefit others.

Fifth, util is the only moral system available to policy-makers. **Goodin 90**[[7]](#footnote-7)

My larger argument turns on the proposition that there is something special about the situation of public officials that makes utilitarianism more probable for them than private individuals. Before proceeding with the large argument, I must therefore say what it is that makes it so special about public officials and their situations that make it both more necessary and more desirable for them to adopt a more credible form of utilitarianism. Consider, first, the argument from necessity. **Public officials** are obliged to **make** their **choices under uncertainty**, and uncertainty **of a** very **special sort** at that. All choices – public and private alike – are made under some degree of uncertainty, of course. But in the nature of things, private individuals will usually have more complete information on the peculiarities of their own circumstances and on the ramifications that alternative possible choices might have for them. Public officials, in contrast, **[they] are** relatively **poorly informed as to the effects that their choices will have on individuals, one by one. What they** typically **do know are** generalities: **averages and aggregates. They know what will happen most often to most people** as a result of their various possible choices, **but that is all. That** is enough to **allow[s]** public **policy-makers to use** the **util**itarian **calculus** – assuming they want to use it at all – to chose general rules or conduct.

Sixth,there’s no act-omission distinction. **Gewirth 82** writes[[8]](#footnote-8)

**To be responsible for inflicting** lethal **harms, a person need not intend or desire to produce such harms**, either as an end or a means. **It is sufficient if the harms come about as an unintended but foreseeable** and controllable **effect of what he does. For since he knows** or has good reasons to believe **what** **actions** or policies under his control **will lead to the harms in question he can control whether the harms will occur**, so that it is within his power to prevent or at least lessen the probability of their occurrence by ceasing to engage in these actions. Thus, just as all persons have the right to informed control, so far as possible, over the conditions relevant to their incurring cancer and other serious harms, so the causal and moral responsibility for inflicting cancer can be attributed to persons who have informed control over other persons’ suffering the lethal harms of cancer.

Seventh, util is epistemologically necessary. Everyone values happiness whether they want to or not. Even people who claim they’re skeptics wouldn’t shoot themselves in the foot.

**Plan**: The USFG ought to provide Pell Grants to inmates in its criminal justice system.

Funding through normal means. I reserve the right to clarify, so no theory violations until he checks in CX. No legal violations link because affirming means amending the laws to make the aff world consistent with them.

**Aff gets RVIs** on I meets and counter-interps because

(a) 1AR timeskew means I can’t cover theory and still have a fair shot on substance.

(b) no risk theory would give neg a free source of no risk offense which allows him to moot the AC.

Advantage 1 is Aerospace Competitiveness

Aerospace industry is declining now due to lack of skilled workers. Increase in community college or vocational training would solve. **Koopmans 12**[[9]](#footnote-9)

SEATTLE - Boeing has a big job ahead - after last week's announcement of airplane orders and commitments worth billions of dollars. Now, **as thousands of aerospace workers prepare to retire,** U.S. **Sen.** Maria **Cantwell** is wondering where the skilled workers will come from to build those planes. During a tour of Machinists Inc., a precision machining company and Boeing supplier in Seattle, Cantwell announced she will be holding a Senate Aviation Subcommittee hearing this week on aviation competitiveness in Washington, D.C. “Over the next 20 years, the aerospace industry is expected to grow by more than $3 trillion,” said Cantwell. “I’m bringing together aviation and aerospace leaders to talk about what they think must be done for the U.S. to remain on top of these industries.”Machinists Inc. is one of hundreds of local manufacturers that will help Boeing reach its goals. The plant will help make parts for the 396 planes Boeing took orders for last week. "Today we're here to make sure that the work force is there to help produce those planes," she said Sunday during her tour of the plant. Cantwell **says 21,000 aerospace workers will be needed over the next decade to keep up with international competitors.** "We want to remain the center of aerospace manufacturing here in the Northwest, so we want to really focus on what we're going to do to get a lot more people interested," she said. To make her point, Cantwell focuses on the numbers.  "**Half of the Boeing work force will be eligible to retire in five to seven years**, meaning that's when there will be a big demand for workers," she says. She says **getting workers in takes** a three-pronged approach.  The first is getting is children interested in aerospace early. Second is **getting the unemployed trained through community and technical colleges.** And third, attracting technically trained veterans as they return from war.  All that and more will be discussed at Cantwell's hearing, scheduled for Wednesday on Capitol Hill in Washington, D.C. The hearing will include testimony from John J. Tracy, chief technology officer for the Boeing Co.; Stan Sorscher of SPEEA; Dan Elwell, senior vice president of Aerospace Industries Association; Nick Calio, president and CEO of Airlines for America; and Pete Bunce, president and CEO of General Aviation Manufacturers Association.

Plan solves aerospace competitiveness. There’s 2 links.

A. Pell Grants incentivize prison community college and vocational programs which teach key tech skills. **Young 11**[[10]](#footnote-10)

Partnerships between corrections and community colleges with their links to business and industry were once common. **Until the mid-1990’s community colleges provided** large numbers of **prisoners** with **post-secondary education** and vocational training. Their programming was shown to reduce recidivism and increased returning inmates’ employment and earning power. 21 **But Pell grants** and other federal sources **that supported community college programs categorically dried up** as the result of changes in the law in the late 1990’s. 22 During the academic year 2009-2010 only 6% of all state prisoners enrolled in vocational or academic postsecondary programs and of these 86% were concentrated in just 13 states. 23 States such as Illinois that still provide community college instruction for prisoners do so with support from one or another combination of line items in the state corrections budget, student head-count funds provided to participating community colleges, or state financial aid, 24 funding that is no more likely to increase in the near future than is funding for other correctional programs. **The federal gov**ernment **could still** provide needed **support** for **a strong community college role in reentry.** In recent years **the Department of Labor awarded community colleges substantial grants for training in tech**nological **fields** such as nuclear and renewable energy, “green” retrofitting and cyber security. 25 The Program for **Prison** Reentry **Strategies would urge** that the Department of Labor invite applicant **community colleges to** collaborate with corrections agencies on one hand and businesses on the other and to integrate **return**ing **prisoners into grantfunded academic and vocational programming.** Ordinarily, gaining the attention of the leadership of a major federal agency such as the Department of Labor for an issue like prisoner reentry might be difficult. Fortunately, the Administration recently created the Federal Interagency Reentry Council and charged it with exactly this task. 26

B. Targeting prisoners is key to competitiveness. They’re a huge population, and they have 0 skilled work opportunities absent Pell Grants. **Chazelle 11**[[11]](#footnote-11)

The practical benefits of educating prisoners are well documented. **Over ninety percent of inmates eventually return to society; those who receive education**al programming **behind bars are more likely to find jobs** and do without government assistance. They have greater capacity to support relatives financially, contribute in positive ways to their communities, and help their kids succeed in school and stay out of trouble. The benefits extend to the wider public, as well, as study after study shows that educating inmates reduces recidivism – the rate at which they commit new crimes leading to re-arrest or re-incarceration. Although statistics vary, it appears that recidivism among offenders who complete some college work in prison drops by ten percent or more, even if they do not finish a degree. **Postsecondary** correctional **education is**, moreover, a **cost-effective** tool for improving public safety, **since it is** invariably **less expensive than prison** (an average of $25,251 per federal inmate in 2009). By lowering recidivism it saves taxpayers’ money, **and given our massive incarcerated population – over 2.3 million – it helps address the growing education gap between the US and other countries.** That prisons should offer postsecondary education would therefore seem common sense, yet this trait is in short supply among our politicians. The problem lies on both sides of the political spectrum: when it comes to educating inmates or, indeed, to implementing any reform that might mitigate the harshness of our penal system, Democrats, fearful of the soft-on-crime label, are as bad as – if not worse than – Republicans. The Clinton era illustrates this well. Our jail and prison population soared under Clinton, who signed **in**to law **the** Violent **Crime Control** and Law Enforcement **Act of 1994**, a bill sponsored by Democrat Representative Jack Brooks and written by then-Senator Joe Biden. Among the measures of this legislation, sometimes called the “Biden Law,” was a $9.7 billion plan to build new prisons and a sharp increase in the number of crimes subject to the death penalty. Although the bill provided $6.1 billion for prevention initiatives, it contained a bipartisan amendment egregiously counter-prevention: **inmates were** henceforth **barred from Pell grants**, the major federal source of college financial assistance for low-income students. The average grant was small, only about $1500 per student in 1994, yet the cumulative impact was huge. With passage of the 1965 Higher Education Act, on which Pell grants were based, the number of postsecondary correctional education programs shot up from twelve that year to 350 during the Reagan presidency. **Ending Pell grants to inmates saved** enough to increase grants to **non-prison students** by **a paltry $5 each** per semester, **while decimating prison postsecondary education programs. After 1994, only eight remained open.**

Space weaponization is inevitable. A strong space program is key to beat China to space. **Quigley 9** writes[[12]](#footnote-12)

Although it is not clear how long the Long War (GWOT) will consume a good portion of the annual US defense budget, increasing DoD funding to space programs is critical not only in supporting the GWOT, but also in deterring threatening space-faring nations such as China. The argument to maintain the space control advantage is emphasized from General Thomas D. White‘s statement, ―capability to deter war is enhanced by the ability to control space and that, in future wars, space control will be coequal with air and sea control.‖ 84 Today‘s DoD budget however does not reflect an equal funding stream of air-land-sea-space and cyber domains. In order **for the US to** be successful with **deter**ring **China’s rise in space** power, **they need to be first** to the punch – they must establish and maintain an aggressive offense to develop, procure and posture US military space assets similar to the effort given during the nuclear arms race of the Cold War. **Leading space theorists** such as Jim Oberg and Everett Dolman **suggest that weaponizing space is inevitable.**85 If this is to be the case, the US cannot afford to lose this race of controlling space. Oberg agrees that **the US cannot afford to lose** this opportunity (to be the first to field them), **otherwise it will** likely **find itself held hostage to the state that does.**86 Whatever the solution, a geo-political consideration to tactfully assess this space race is required so as not to diminish the years of good economic relations with China. **The US cannot be first to the punch without the proper care**, feeding, and funding **of its space** acquisition **programs.** Consistent with rebalanced national strategies and space policy, the DoD along with the Air Force should re-prioritize requirements for programs that support both the GWOT long war and emerging space threats such as China. Strategy and policy changes should drive funding allocation justified by events such as the recent Chinese ASAT shoot down.

China space heg causes Asian space race. **Moltz 12** writes[[13]](#footnote-13)

**The** main **impetus for** much of the **regional space tumult** over the past decade **is China’s** rapid **emergence as a military space power.** Though China published a 2011 white paper outlining its space plans that is notably silent on military aims, the country has been pressing forward toward a range of military space capabilities, including space weapons. In the most dramatic example (which Chinese officials first denied, then claimed was a threat to no one), China tested an antisatellite technology in 2007 by destroying a weather satellite, creating more than 3,000 large pieces of orbiting debris. It is one-third of the way into deploying a 35-satellite GPS system called Beidou that will help its missile guidance, although it will offer commercial navigation services as well. In the civil field, China is only the third country to have launched its own astronauts; in September 2011, it placed its first space station, Tiangong-1, into orbit. It has conducted an unmanned docking already, and its Shenzhou 9 mission later this year will bring the first Chinese astronauts—or taikonauts—to the station. With its rapidly growing economy, China can afford a large and increasing investment in all areas of space. While **this** is unsettling and even worrisome for the United States, it **poses an existential threat for China’s neighbors**. These countries face increased military risks and the prospect of losing political and economic influence as Beijing attempts to establish regional space hegemony. **India has reacted by establishing** a **new** agency called the Integrated Space Cell, bringing a group of military and civilian officials together to oversee **defense programs for space**. The government in New Delhi has ordered military satellites for each branch of its armed services and pledged to match China’s capability by deploying a ground-launched antisatellite weapon. Where India had previously concentrated on space applications in the service of its population (communications, telemedicine, and agricultural information), it has recently expanded its program in order to compete with China in high-prestige space science. Projects currently underway include its Chandrayaan-2 lunar lander and rover, a Mars mission, and an expensive, independent human space flight program. Meanwhile, on China’s eastern side, **Japan has felt** the **pressure to step up its game, or risk losing its** current **place as Asia’s space** technology **leader.** In the past decade, the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency has pushed ahead in launching the first mission to return particles from an asteroid, carried out a lunar mapping mission with high-definition imagery, built the Kibo research module for the International Space Station, and developed one of only three spacecraft systems now certified to supply the station. Most notably, **Japan shocked** many **observers by moving quickly** in 2008 following China’s antisatellite test **to end its** 30-year **ban on military space activities**. While the military’s main focus is on reconnaissance and early warning, senior Japanese leaders have not ruled out possible development of “defensive” space weapons in the future.

Space race causes extinction. Outweighs and turns nuclear war. **Mitchell et al 1**[[14]](#footnote-14)

A buildup of space weapons might begin with noble intentions of 'peace through strength' deterrence, but this rationale glosses over the tendency that '… the presence of space weapons…will result in the increased likelihood of their use'. This drift toward usage is strengthened by a strategic fact elucidated by Frank Barnaby: when it comes to arming the heavens, 'anti-ballistic missiles and antisatellite warfare technologies go hand-in-hand'. The interlocking nature of offense and defense in military space technology stems from the inherent 'dual capability' of spaceborne weapon components. As Marc Vidricaire, Delegation of Canada to the UN Conference on Disarmament, explains: 'If you want to intercept something in space, you could use the same capability to target something on land'. To the extent that ballistic missile interceptors based in space can knock out enemy missiles in mid-flight, such interceptors can also be used as orbiting 'Death Stars', capable of sending munitions hurtling through the Earth's atmosphere. **The dizzying speed of space warfare would introduce intense 'use or lose' pressure** into strategic calculations, with the spectre of split-second attacks **creating** incentives to rig **orbiting Death Stars with** automated **'hair trigger' devices.** In theory, this automation would enhance survivability of vulnerable space weapon platforms. However, by taking the decision to commit violence out of human hands and endowing computers with authority to make war, military planners could sow insidious seeds of accidental conflict. Yale sociologist Charles Perrow has analyzed 'complexly interactive, tightly coupled' industrial systems such as space weapons, which have many sophisticated components that all depend on each other's flawless performance. According to Perrow, this **interlocking complexity makes** it impossible to foresee all the different ways such systems could fail. As Perrow explains, '[t]he odd term "normal accident" is meant to signal that, given the system characteristics, multiple and **unexpected** interactions of **failures** are **inevitable'.** Deployment of **space weapons** with pre-delegated authority to fire death rays or unleash killer projectiles **would** likely **make war itself inevitable,** given the susceptibility of such systems to 'normal accidents'. It is chilling to contemplate the possible effects of a space war. According to retired Lt. Col. Robert M. Bowman, **'even a tiny projectile** reentering-**from space** strikes the earth with such high velocity that it **can do** enormous damage — **even more [damage] than** would be done by **a nuclear weapon of the same size!'**. In the same Star Wars technology touted as a quintessential tool of peace, defense analyst David Langford sees one of the most destabilizing offensive weapons ever conceived: 'One imagines dead cities of microwave-grilled people'. Given this unique potential for destruction, it is not hard to imagine that **any nation** subjected to space weapon attack **would retaliate with maximum force, including** use of **nuclear, bio**logical, and/**or chemical weapons.** An accidental war sparked by a computer glitch in space could plunge the world into the most destructive military conflict ever seen.

Existential risk outweighs every other impact by orders of magnitude because of the lost potential for future generations. **Bostrom 11**[[15]](#footnote-15)

Even if we use **the most conservative** of these **estimates,** which entirely ignores the possibility of space colonization and software minds, we **find that the expected loss of an existential catastrophe is greater than** the value of **1018 human lives.  This implies that** the expected value of **reducing existential risk by a mere one millionth of one percentage point is at least ten times the value of a billion human lives.**  The more technologically comprehensive estimate of 1054 human-brain-emulation subjective life-years (or 1052 lives of ordinary length) makes the same point even more starkly.  Even if we give this allegedly lower bound on the cumulative output potential of a technologically mature civilization a mere 1% chance of being correct, we find that the expected value of reducing existential risk by a mere one billionth of one billionth of one percentage point is worth a hundred billion times as much as a billion human lives.

Moral uncertainty means that extinction comes first under any moral system.

**Bostrom-2** writes[[16]](#footnote-16)

These reflections on **moral uncertainty suggest[s]** an alternative, complementary way of looking at existential risk. Let me elaborate. Our present understanding of axiology might well be confused. **[that] We may not** now **know**—at least not in concrete detail—**what outcomes would count as a big win for humanity;** we might not even yet be able to imagine the best ends of our journey. If we are indeed profoundly **uncertain about our ultimate aims,** then **we should recognize that there is** a **great option value in preserving**—and ideally improving—**our ability to recognize value and to steer the future accordingly. Ensuring that there will be a future version of humanity with great powers and a propensity to use them wisely is** plausibly **the best way** available to us **to increase the probability that the future will contain a lot of value.**

Infinite values don’t paralyze calculation. **Lauwers and Vallentyne 04** write[[17]](#footnote-17)

**Zero Independence holds that the ranking of two worlds is determined by** the pattern of **differences in local value. This**, we claim, **is highly plausible** in the context of finitely additive value theories. In the finite case, finitely additive value theories always satisfy Zero Independence. Although they typically get expressed as judging a world as at least as good as another (having the same locations) if and only if its total value is at least as great, the **reference to the total is not needed.** An equivalent statement is that one world as at least as good as the second if and only if the sum of the differences in value is at least as great as zero. **Only the pattern of differences matters**. **Even in the infinite case**, Zero Independence is “partially” implied by Sum and Loose Pareto. Sum ranks U as at least as good as V if and only if Sum ranks U-V as at least as good as its zero world. Moreover, if two worlds U and V satisfy the antecedent clause of Loose Pareto, then Loose Pareto ranks U as at least as good as V if and only if it ranks U-V above its zero world. Zero Independence is thus, we claim, highly plausible for finitely additive theories.

Zero Independence is equivalent to a condition in social choice theory known as Translation Scale Invariance when it is restricted to the case where locations are the same.[[18]](#footnote-18) This latter condition holds that interlocational comparisons of zero points are irrelevant to the ranking of worlds. The zero point for value at each location, that is, can be set independently of how it is set for other locations (although, of course, when comparing two worlds, the zero point used for a given location in one world must also be used for that location in the second world). For example, if a location has values of 10 in world U and 5 in world V, both measured on the basis of some particular zero point (the same for both worlds), those values could be changed to 7 and 2 (by making the zero point 3 units higher for that location), and this, according to Translation Scale Invariance, would not alter how the two worlds are ranked.

Zero Independence is equivalent to Translation Scale Invariance (restricted to the case where locations are the same), since any change in the zero points for the locations in worlds U and V can, for some W, be represented by U+W and V+W. (For example, if there are just two people, and the first person’s zero point is decreased by two units, and the second person’s zero point is increased by one unit, then the resulting two representations of the value of U and V are simply U+W and V+W, where W is <2,-1>.) Zero Independence and Translation Scale Invariance thus each hold that U ≥ V if and only if U+W ≥ V+W.

Translation Scale Invariance (and hence, Zero Independence) is highly plausible for finitely additive value theories. (Recall that our goal is to defend a particular extension of finite additivity, not to defend finite additivity against non-additive theories.) **If there is no natural zero point that separates positive from negative value** (if there is just more or less value with no natural separating point), **then any particular zero point is arbitrary** (not representing a real aspect of value). In this case, interlocational comparisons of zero-points are uncontroversially irrelevant. **If**, on the other hand, **there is a natural zero for value, it is still** plausible for finitely additive value theories to hold that it is **irrelevant** for ranking worlds. **What matters** (e.g., **from** a **util**itarian perspective), as argued above, **are** the **differences in value at each location between two worlds—not the absolute level of values** at locations. No interlocational comparison of zero points is needed for this purpose.

Ignore indicts of the possibility of util calc. **Hardin 90** writes[[19]](#footnote-19)

**One** of the **cute**r **charge**s **against util**itarianism **is that** it is irrational in the following sense. **If I take the time to calculate** the consequences of various courses of action before me, **then** I will ipso facto have chosen the course of action to take, namely, to sit and calculate, because while I am calculating the other **courses of action will cease to be open to me. It should embarrass philosophers that they have ever taken this** objection **seriously. Parallel considerations in other realms are dismissed** with eminently good sense. Lord Devlin notes, “If the reasonable man ‘worked to rule’ by perusing to the point of comprehension every form he was handed, the commercial and administrative life of the country would creep **to** a standstill.” James March and Herbert Simon **escape** the quandary of **unending calculation** by noting that often we satisfice, **we do not maximize: we stop calculating** and considering **when we find a merely adequate choice** of action. **When**, in principle, **one cannot know what is** the **best** choice, **one can nevertheless be sure that** sitting and **calculating is not the best choice.** But, one may ask, How do you know that another ten minutes of calculation would not have produced a better choice? And one can only answer, You do not. At some point the quarrel begins to sound adolescent. It is ironic that **the point** of the quarrel **is almost never at issue in practice** (as Devlin implies, **we are** almost all **too reasonable** in practice **to bring the world to a standstill**) but only in the principled discussions of academics.

Contention 2 is Solvency

Empirics prove. Lack of Pell Grants decimates post-secondary prison education programs which independently jacks crime rates. **Buzzini 09**[[20]](#footnote-20)

[Brackets in original text] It’s no secret that the education system in the United States is in shambles – and not just for inmates. Students aren’t receiving a proper education, which encourages the nation’s youth to get involved in gangs, drugs, and violence. **Many inmates** can’t even **read** well, ranking in **at** “maybe a **seventh-grade level**” (Leder 1). Were it possible for inmates to receive an education while serving time (a GED if an equivalent had not been attained, followed by **[With] a** post-secondary **degree**) **they would have a much greater chance of escaping** the clutches of **poverty and** their ties to **illegal activity when** they are **released** back into society. This must have been the line of thinking that inspired the inception of the first post-secondary correctional education program, which began in 1953 at the University of Southern Illinois in Menard. Such a program must have been a bit ahead of its time, because by 1965 only 11 more post-secondary correctional education (PCSE) programs appeared. 1965 was a landmark year for PCSE it marked the first time that inmates were eligible to receive Pell Grants to fund their college aspirations. **Thanks to** the availability of **federal funding, programs began popping up nationwide.** In 1973 there were 182 programs; by 1982 there were 350. Programs reached their peak when, **in the** early 19**90s, there were** a total of 772 on-site college **programs in 1,287 prisons** (Taylor “Pell Grants” 2). **The majority** of inmates **covered their costs with** the aid of **the Pell Grant. However, in** 19**94, thanks to** the prevailing **“tough on crime” attitude** of the time, **inmates** were **no longer** able to **receive** federal aid in the form of **Pell Grants.** While peak enrollment in PCSE programs totaled at 12 percent of inmate populations, the s0-called “deteriorated state” counted less than 4 percent (Taylor “Pell Grants” 3). There is **myriad statistical data** to **show that education programs** inside prisons **aid in** actual **rehab**ilitation **and** do **reduce recidivism** rates. But these facts were glossed over as politicians wowed their constituents with their tough policies regarding crime. However, they didn’t bother to mention to their constituents that “**Massachusetts, Maryland, and New York** are among the states [that **reported**] **reductions in recidivism** of as high as 15.5 percent for inmates who participated in education programs (Freedman 6).” That 15.5 percent reduction means 15.5 percent of inmates were *actually* rehabilitated, as opposed to merely punished, during their time on the inside. The numbers are even more impressive on a national scale, as “**inmates with** at least two years of **college had a 10 percent re-arrest rate; the national average is 60 percent**” (“Statehouses Debate…”). That means 50 percent less people went back to prison, simply because they completed some form of higher education. It is for reasons such as this that “critics lament the loss of **Pell Grants** as short-sighted in light of studies documenting **lower recidivism** and misconduct rates among inmates who pursue post-secondary education” (Freedman 8). It truly is a serious loss, for the depletion of funding via Pell Grants for PSCE has resulted in a devastating loss of programs nationwide, despite such programs’ ability to reduce recidivism **and** markedly **rehabilitate** many **inmates who participate.** Should the Pell Grant be re-instated, corrections in America would see a much-needed turn for the better.

Pell Grants solve prison violence and crime, boost productivity and link turn proportionality. **Clinton 7** writes[[21]](#footnote-21)

Getting an **education** while **in prison** further **reduces** the chances that an inmate will commit another **crime when released. Before 1995, there were** about **350 college**-degree **programs for prisoners. Today there are fewer than twenty**, **because Congress**, over my administration’s opposition, **eliminated Pell grants** for state and federal prisoners in 1994. Four of the remaining programs are in New York, thanks to the Bard Prison Initiative, a privately funded effort organized by 2001 Bard graduate Max Kenner. The four programs have about 120 students, only 10 percent of those who apply for them. **Prison officials say inmates involved in education are much better behaved.** Their **professors say they work hard to learn** the material. The student inmates ay they love the classes. Why? In April 2007, Reshawn Hughes told 60 Minutes, “While at Bard, I learned that freedom is something much different than just a physicality, a space of physical existence. Freedom has a lot to do with your ability to communicate with others. To see the world in a different view.” Mika’il DeVeaux, who founded Citizens Against Recidivism with his wife after studying theology while a prisoner at Sing Sing and getting an MA in sociology, says a college education is the surest way to close the revolving door of crime and imprisonment. The Bard Initiative costs $2,000 per inmate per year, compared with New York’s incarceration cost of $32,000. **It’s a good investment in a safer, more productive society. We have more than two million** people **incarcerated**, more than any other Western country. **The vast majority are** imprisoned **for nonviolent offenses.** More than 90 percent of them will eventually get out. **Each year 750,000** prisoners, including 150,000 juveniles, **are released.** Theoretically, **they have paid their debt to society and are entitled to a new beginning.** Too few of our fellow citizens are willing to give it to them. Thankfully, Ready4Work, the Bard Prison Initiative, and Citizens Against Recidivism do.

Rehab is inevitable. Absent the Plan, it will be religious rehab which non-uniques disads but doesn’t solve crime. **Lockard 12**[[22]](#footnote-22)

This is a world to which the recently deceased [Charles Colson](http://www.ajc.com/news/nation-world/watergate-figure-charles-colson-1423592.html) contributed greatly, one where true knowledge comes from the bible, the Book of Mormon, and a few other holy texts. The awards dinner featured a solid contingent of Colson’s [Prison Fellowship](http://www.prisonfellowship.org/prison-fellowship-home) volunteers. Organized religious missions have been coming to prisons since the late eighteenth century, when the Philadelphia Society for Alleviating the Miseries of Prisonssent mostly Quaker volunteers to Walnut Street Jail. Throughout the nineteenth and into the twentieth century US **prisons were sites of religious predation**, primarily led by Christian evangelicals. Limited efforts at educational modernization through **secular** post-secondary academic **programs came to a halt with the** 1994 **ban on Pell grants** for prisoners, legislation that had profoundly counter-productive effects. Colson’s growing success at **prison evangelization** programs **coincided with** the **gutting of higher education** opportunities in prisons. But despite enjoying a law career based on the advantages of an Ivy League undergraduate education, Colson disliked higher education as a diversion from spiritual pursuits. He had no use for contemporary intellectual debates, dismissing them as “the big lie of post-modernism” that distracted from rock-solid faith in Jesus as savior. In [God and Government](http://zondervan.com/9780310277644), Colson attacked the Enlightenment as a source of a mistaken understanding of human nature that led to a disastrous pursuit of social utopianism. He denounced universities as centers of moral relativism unfit to educate students who needed guidance toward moral authority. Colson’s vision of prison ministries corresponded with what he believed lacking from secular education – a Christ-centered path to improvement of self and society. Although he adopted the language of marginalization and oppression in describing prison inmates, Colson believed that address to the social origins of crime lay in spirituality rather than education that addressed the material world. Nowhere in his extensive writings does Colson engage with Pell grants and the disappearance of higher education from prisons. The politics that Colson advocated remained as deeply reactionary after his prison sentence as before. Rather, his experience combined with a new Christian evangelism added a coloration of social care that had been absent. His very popular and much-reprinted autobiography, [Born Again](http://www.hendrickson.com/html/product/562514.trade.html), is filled with recounted political dialogue in White House offices and details of conversion and Christian fellowship found among Washington insiders. He views himself as an instrument in the Lord’s hands, unconscious before his downfall and conscious afterwards. “What happened in court today,” he said to the press after sentencing, “was the court’s will and the Lord’s will—I have committed my life to Jesus Christ and I can work for Him in prison as well as out.” The state, its institutions, and legal decisions in Colson’s view coincided with and remained subordinate to his own interpretation of Christian redemption. Born Again contains no condemnation of the lack of fellowship in Nixon’s racist Southern strategy, and has only praise for his president’s decision to bomb North Vietnam and prosecute the US genocide in south-east Asia. Ironically, it was the illegality of Colson’s obstruction of justice concerning a conspiracy against Daniel Ellsberg for his Pentagon Papers revelations about Vietnam that led to a seven-month prison sentence. In Colson’s version of his life story, his mistake lay in the hubris of ignoring God while in the White House. The rest of his life was repentance and corrective spiritual action, which he construed to include anti-Darwinism, opposition to gay and lesbian rights, and an array of reactionary causes. Another reading of Colson’s life is that he remained a faithful servant of the state, one who successfully advocated spiritual submission for prisoners rather than an education that would enable them to critique society more acutely and pursue intellectual self-reliance. The Prison Fellowship Ministries collaborate with prison administrations to operate a private-public partnership for obscurantism by missionizing a captive population. Such work with a domestic underclass recapitulates historic Euro-american imperialism’s combination of state and religious power to produce passive laboring subjects. The carceral state values narratives that confess sin, embrace salvational repentance, and advocate compliance with an ordained social order. Such narratives gain official sanction because, as Tanya Erzen argues, “Personal narratives of individual transformation are central to testimonial politics, and they work in conjunction with a neoliberal vision in which social services are privatized rather than funded by the federal government…Testimonial politics support the **faith-based policies** of economic privatization that **place the onus for solving social problems on the individual and** on the power of God to transform lives.” Colson modeled the compliant subject, entirely unlike the resistant prison narratives of [Jimmy Santiago Baca](http://www.jimmysantiagobaca.com/). For Colson, a prisoner needed to learn social conformity alongside Christian submission. Prison was a place to ask questions only of oneself, not about society. Colson **did not challenge the massive growth of US prisons** since he served time in the 1970s or the role of the drug wars in fueling that growth. The entanglement of state and religion that Colson pursued resulted in a 2007 Eighth Circuit decision,Americans United for Separation of Church and State v. Prison Fellowship Ministries, which sustained a lower court decision striking down a state-funded Fellowship-run InnerChange Freedom Initiative re-entry program in Iowa prisons that employed Bible counselors and evangelical Christian programming. Although the Iowa program no longer exists, it still functions in Minnesota and Texas. Colson’s efforts to foster Christian evangelism on taxpayer money, a clear breach of the Establishment Clause, are withering. Where he has succeeded is in bringing volunteers into prisons to do the same work free of charge, where they preach personal faith instead of educate. There are social costs in ignoring the profoundly life-altering potential of higher education. Colson’s post-Watergate career was dedicated to a blinkered Bible-centered vision of salvation and individual transformation in prisons, a vision that attached no importance to a broad humanities and sciences education. It is a legacy that needs undoing.

Contention 3 is preempts

Ignore permissibility and presumption because moral uncertainty means we’ll always have a non-zero credence in the existence of morality, so there’s always a risk of offense in favor of one action.

Neg burden is to defend a competitive post-fiat United States policy. Offense-defense is key to fairness and real world education. This means ignore skepticism. **Nelson 08** writes[[23]](#footnote-23)

And **the truth-statement model** of the resolution **imposes an absolute burden of proof on the aff**irmative: if the resolution is a truth-claim, and the afﬁrmative has the burden of proving that claim, in so far as intuitively we tend to disbelieve truthclaims until we are persuaded otherwise, the afﬁrmative has the burden to prove that statement absolutely true. Indeed, one of the most common theory arguments in LD is conditionality, which argues it is inappropriate for the afﬁrmative to claim only proving the truth of part of the resolution is sufﬁcient to earn the ballot. Such a model of the resolution also gives the negative access to a range of strategies that many students, coaches, and judges ﬁnd ridiculous or even irrelevant to evaluation of the resolution.

If the **neg**ative **need only** prevent the affirmative from proving the truth of the resolution, it is logically sufficient to negate to **deny our ability to make truth-statements or** to **prove** normative **morality does not exist** or to deny the reliability of human senses or reason. Yet, even though most coaches appear to endorse the truth-statement model of the resolution, they complain about the use of such negative strategies, even though they are a necessary consequence of that model. And, moreover, **such strategies** seem fundamentally unfair, as they **provide the neg**ative **with functionally inﬁnite ground**, as there are a nearly inﬁnite variety of such skeptical objections to normative claims, while continuing to bind the afﬁrmative to a much smaller range of options: advocacy of the resolution as a whole.

Instead, it seems much more reasonable to treat the resolution as a way to equitably divide ground: the affirmative advocating the desirability of a world in which people adhere to the value judgment implied by the resolution and the negative advocating the desirability of a world in which people adhere to a value judgment mutually exclusive to that implied by the resolution. By making the issue one of desirability of **[Under] competing world-views** rather than of truth, the affirmative gains access to increased flexibility regarding how he or she chooses to defend that world, while the **neg**ative **retains equal flexibility while being denied** access to those **skeptical arguments** indicted above. Our ability to make normative claims is irrelevant to a discussion of the desirability of making two such claims. Unless there is some significant harm in making such statements, some offensive reason to reject making them that can be avoided by an advocacy mutually exclusive with that of the affirmative such objections are not a reason the negative world is more desirable, and therefore not a reason to negate. Note this is precisely how things have been done in policy debate for some time: a team that runs a kritik is expected to offer some impact of the mindset they are indicting and some alternative that would solve for that impact. A team that simply argued some universal, unavoidable, problem was bad and therefore a reason to negate would not be very successful. It is about time LD started treating such arguments the same way.

**Such a model** of the resolution has additional benefits as well. First, it **forces both debaters to offer offensive reasons to prefer** their worldview, thereby further **enforcing a parallel burden structure.** This means debaters can no longer get away with arguing the resolution is by definition true of false. The “truth” of the particular vocabulary of the resolution is irrelevant to its desirability. **Second, it is intuitive. When people evaluate** the truth of **ethical claims, they consider their implications in the real world.** They ask themselves whether a world in which people live by that ethical rule is better than one in which they don’t. Such debates don’t happen solely in the abstract. We want to know how the various options affect us and the world we live in.

The neg must defend one unconditional advocacy. Conditionality is bad because it makes the neg a moving target which kills 1AR strategy. Also, it’s unreciprocal because I can’t kick the AC.

**Plan focus is good. Aff can implement a plan. Reasons to prefer**

1. Education.

(a) Plans increase depth of education because we can focus on one specific issue each round instead of touching briefly on each aspect of the topic.

(b) Plans are key to incentivize continued research. If the same stock arguments are going to apply every round, there’s no incentive to do new work.

2. Extinction. Debating specific nuclear scenarios is key to stave off actual nuclear war.

**Harvard Nuclear Study Group 83** writes[[24]](#footnote-24)

The question is grisly, but nonetheless it must be asked. **Nuclear war cannot be avoided** simply **by refusing to think about it.** Indeed the task of **reducing** the likelihood of **nuclear war should begin with** an effort to **understand[ing] how it might start. When strategists in Washington** or Moscow **study** the possible origins of **nuclear war, they discuss “scenarios,”** imagined sequences of future events that could trigger the use of nuclear weaponry. Scenarios are, of course, speculative exercises. They often leave out the political developments that might lead to the use of force in order to focus on military dangers. That nuclear war scenarios are even more speculative than most is something for which we can be thankful, for it reflects humanity’s fortunate lack of experience with atomic warfare since 1945. But imaginary as they are, **nuclear scenarios can help identify problems not understood or dangers not yet** prevented because they have not been **foreseen.**

3. Textuality. “Resolved” means a policy.

**Words and Phrases 64** writes[[25]](#footnote-25)

**[The] Definition of** the word **“resolve,”** given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It **is** of **similar** force **to the word “enact,”** which is defined by Bouvier as **meaning “to establish by law”.**

“Ought” can only refer to action, even in the context of “ought to be.”

**Prichard 12** writes[[26]](#footnote-26)

But this argument, if it is to restore the sense of obligation to act, must presuppose an intermediate link, viz., the further thesis that what is good ought to be. The necessity of this link is obvious. An "ought," if it is to be derived at all, can only be derived from another "ought." Moreover this link tacitly presupposes another, viz., that the apprehension that something good which is not an action ought to be involves just the feeling of imperativeness or obligation which is to be aroused by the thought of the action which will originate it. Otherwise the argument will not lead us to feel the obligation to produce it by the action. And, surely, both this link and its implication are false.[1](http://www.ditext.com/prichard/mistake.html#1) **The word "ought" refers to actions and to actions alone.** The proper language is never "So and so ought to be," but "I ought to do so and so." **Even if we** are sometimes moved to say that the world or something in it is not what it **ought to be, what we really mean is** that God or **some human** being has not made something what he **ought to have made it**. And it is merely stating another side of this fact to urge that we can only feel the imperativeness upon us of something which is in our power; **for** it is actions and **actions alone** which, directly at least, **are in our power.**

Every reason plan-focus is good is a disad to voting on theory. It trades off with Pell Grants education.

Pell Grants are fair.

1. Wiki solves predictability.

2. Pell grants are the core of the topic. They’re the primary obstacle to education in the squo. Federal ban on Pell Grants passed because of a retributive mindset. That’s Buzzini 09.

3. Pell grants are the only federal aff. Any other interp forces me to defend simultaneous 50 state action which is bad because it’s utopian and not real world. Also kills my ground since no one in the lit defends 50 state action. This also proves I create small limits for the topic.

4. Default to field context to determine T violations. That determines whether the plan is in the lit base. I meet. Pell grants are considered rehab in the lit, and the ban on pell grants is retributive – that’s Buzzini 09.

5. Plans are key to stable advocacy so neg can’t moot the AC with definitional tricks.

6. Whole rez is incoherent. The state can’t use every competing rehab policy on every prisoner.

Gut check against dumb theory. Competing interps creates a race to the bottom where every round comes down to theory. Intervention is inevitable in blippy theory debates.

Err Aff on theory. Negs won 8% more prelims at Harvard. This also means presume aff if presumption matters.

Err towards small schools on theory to account for resource disparity that makes it harder for me to win.

Err against debaters who don’t disclose. It gives me an infinite research burden which kills fairness and pre-round topic education.

Prefer aff interpretations. Key to clash. **O’Donnell 4** writes[[27]](#footnote-27)

**AFC preserves the value of the [1AC]** first affirmative constructive speech. **This speech is the starting point for the debate.** It is a function of necessity. The debate must begin somewhere if it is to begin at all. **Failure to grant AFC** is a denial of the service rendered by the affirmative team’s labor when they crafted this speech. Further, if the affirmative does not get to pick the starting point, **[renders] the opening speech** act is essentially rendered **meaningless while the rest of the debate becomes a debate about what we should be debating about.**

## 1AR

### AT Speed K

1. 95% of all LD debates are slow and traditional, and 2 of the 3 national tournaments are slow also. Two impacts. (a) he has no uniqueness, you can compete at slow tournaments now. (b) he excludes fast debaters because he prohibits speed at the only fast tournament.

2. Turn: spreading boosts short term memory, key to education and everyday life

**Psychology Today** October 19**92** (report of the results of the Raine et al study)

"If friends criticize you for talking too fast, at least they can't also accuse you of having a bad memory. **Speech rate is a strong index of short term memory** span... 'Therefore, **the faster you can talk, the greater your** short-term **memory,**' says Adrian Raine, PhD, a University of Southern California psychologist. The link has been established for adults for some time, Raine reports in Child Development. Now, he and his colleagues find the correlation holds for kids as well, a finding that promises short-term payoff in the classroom and long-term payoff in life. **Short-term memory is the power behind recall of phone numbers, directions, and other everyday tasks.** It is also the foundation of arithmetic and reading skills... That raises the possibility that speech- training may be a short-cut to achievement." (p.14)

3. How fast is ‘too fast’? There’s no bright line.

4. Personal ethics solves. I don’t spread against novices. He’s qualled to the TOC. He can obviously follow speed. None of his studies are in the context of varsity of debaters who have been trained to follow speed.

5. His studies are empirically denied in the context of debate. Dyslexic debaters have won octos bid tournaments.

6. Public forum and speech solve.

7. TURN – aff speed is key to solve neg timeskew. Round 1 of this tournament had a 10% neg bias. If I had just spoken slowly, he would have spread me out.

8. Spreading’s key to education. (A) We can go more in depth in round, (B) it encourages more research out of round because we need more cards to fill in the longer speeches, (C) it’s key to critical thinking because we have to make more in round strategic decisions.

9. No terminal impact to his arguments. It doesn’t matter if he makes debate inclusive if it’s utterly devoid of education as a result. The people who are included don’t benefit.

10. Prewritten arguments solve. He can follow along.

11. Default to community consensus; we wouldn’t spread unless there were good reason to.

12. Voting aff puts me into elims which will inspire other small school debaters. That’s a larger form of exclusion because it’s empirically verified year after year by the domination of large schools in TOC elims.

13. Fast debate is more fun. That’s why we do it. Boredom excludes people who like having fun.

14.: Talking faster solves memory loss in old age.

**Hulme**, Charles **& Mackenzie**, Susie. (19**92**). Working Memory and Severe

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"These results are striking in that the same linear function relating recall to speech rate fits the results for all age groups. Subjects of different ages in this study all recalled, on average, as much as they could say in roughly 1.5 seconds. **Increases in memory span with age are** seen to be **very closely related to changes in speech rate** with age. Thus the results of these different **studies are remarkably clear and consistent.** The dramatic improvements in serial recall performance with increasing age are closely and quantitatively related to changes in speech rate. In terms of the articulatory loop theory, which gave impetus to these studies, the length of the loop appears to remain constant across different ages; more material is stored in this system because it can be spoken and so rehearsed more rapidly. These results, relating developmental increases in speech rate to increases in short-term memory efficiency, lead quite directly to a simple causal theory: That **increases in memory span with age depend upon increases in speech rate.** Needless to say, however, such a theory is not necessitated by the findings. The findings are essentially correlational; as children get older their speech rate increases and in line with this so does their memory performance. It could be that both these changes depend upon some other factor. The obvious way to test this causal theory is to conduct a training study. If short-term memory depends upon speech rate, if we can successfully train children to speak faster, then this should, according to the theory, lead to a corresponding increase in short-term memory. (p.45)

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